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1  The economic Recovery Act of 2008, which 
was enacted on July 30, 2008, established the 
Federal housing Finance Agency (FhFA) 
by combining the Office of Federal housing 
enterprise Oversight (OFheO) and the Federal 
housing Finance board (FhFb). The legislation 
calls for OFheO and the FhFb to be abolished 
one year from the date of enactment.
ankruptcy filings are on the rise, and millions 
of households have either lost their homes to 
foreclosure or are on the verge of losing them.  
One subject of debate amid this rising number 
of bankruptcies is how personal bankruptcy laws deal with 
residential housing. This subject centers on two main 
issues: First, how do personal bankruptcy laws affect the 
availability of mortgages and the terms on which borrowers 
obtain mortgages? Second, how do personal bankruptcy 
filings affect the outcome of mortgage foreclosures? in this 
article, Wenli li discusses these questions and examines 
the economic literature to shed some light on the 
legislative and policy debates that are likely to recur after 
the current crisis is over.
The subprime mortgage crisis 
that started in late 2006 has caused a 
sharp correction in the U.S. housing 
market. by the second quarter of 2008, 
real housing prices had dropped for 
four consecutive quarters, year over 
year, according to the Federal housing 
Finance Agency house price index.1 
Meanwhile, lenders have tightened 
credit conditions by either charging 
higher rates or denying credit to 
those who would have gotten credit 
before the crisis. As a result, many 
households, especially those whose 
adjustable mortgage rates are scheduled 
to increase, are struggling to pay their 
bills. bankruptcy filing rates have gone 
up – following the sharp rise and even 
sharper decline that accompanied the 
2005 changes in the bankruptcy law – 
and millions of households have either 
lost their homes to foreclosure or are 
on the verge of losing them (Figure 1).
One subject that has received 
some attention, particularly from 
policymakers, as a result of the current 
crisis is how personal bankruptcy 
laws deal with residential housing.  
Although the housing and economic 
Recovery Act of 2008 does not contain 
direct changes to the current personal 
bankruptcy laws, proposals to reform 
bankruptcy laws were a central part 
of the debate.  For instance, the 
helping Families Save Their homes 
in bankruptcy Act, introduced in 
October 2007 but not included in 
the final law, amends the federal 
bankruptcy law to permit a bankruptcy 
plan to modify the mortgages of 
certain debtors and to provide for 
payment of such a loan at a fixed 
annual interest rate over a 30-year 
period. 
There are two main issues 
concerning residential housing and 
personal bankruptcy law. One is how 
personal bankruptcy laws affect the 
availability of mortgages and the 
terms at which borrowers obtain their 
mortgages. The other is how personal 
bankruptcy filing affects the outcome 
of mortgage foreclosure. economists 
have studied both issues, though the 
first issue has received somewhat more 
attention in the economic literature.  
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achieved complete agreement on either 
question, it does shed some light on 
the legislative and policy debates that 
are likely to come up again after the 
dust settles somewhat on the current 
crisis.
EFFECT OF PERSONAL 
BANKRUPTCY LAWS ON 
AVAILABILITY AND PRICE OF 
MORTGAGES
There are two broad categories 
of household debt. Secured 
(collateralized) debt allows creditors 
to reclaim the collateral if the debtor 
defaults on the loan. The main 
examples of secured debt are mortgages 
and automobile loans. Unsecured 
debt – mainly credit card debt and 
installment credit – has no collateral 
that creditors can seize. Foreclosure 
laws govern the default on secured 
mortgage loans and are unique to each 
state. (See The Foreclosure Process for a 
short description of the main features 
of state foreclosure laws.) however, 
consumers can forestall foreclosure by 
electing bankruptcy, which is governed 
by the federal bankruptcy code.   
Personal Bankruptcy Laws. 
There are two separate bankruptcy 
procedures: chapters 7 and 13. The 
two chapters differ in that debtors 
who file under chapter 7 are obliged 
to repay debt out of their assets, to 
the extent that their assets exceed 
predetermined exemption levels. 
Debtors who file under chapter 13 
are obliged to repay debt out of their 
income over a period of time after 
deducting reasonable living expenses.  
Personal bankruptcy is governed 
by federal law, and there are separate 
federal exemption levels for the 
household’s homestead (home 
equity in residential housing) and 
nonhomestead or other personal 
property (jewelry, furniture, savings, 
and so forth). States also set their own 
exemptions. While some states allow 
filers to opt out of the state exemptions 
for federal ones, other states disallow 
the use of federal exemptions. As 
mentioned above, chapter 7 filers 
surrender all of their assets above the 
exemption levels in exchange for the 
discharge of their remaining unsecured 
debt not covered by the asset seized. 
exemptions also have significance in 
chapter 13 through the “best interests 
of the creditors” test, which states that 
creditors are entitled to receive at least 
as much in chapter 13 as they would 
have received in chapter 7. Thus, in a 
state with high exemptions, creditors 
should also expect lower repayments in 
chapter 13. 
bankruptcy laws reduce (“strip 
down”) debts secured by cars to the 
fair market value of the car at the time 
of the bankruptcy filing, and debts that 
exceed the fair market value become 
unsecured. but they do not allow for 
modification of mortgage loans secured 
solely by the borrower’s principal 
residence. nevertheless, chapter 7 
bankruptcy voids deficiency payments2 
in the same way that it voids 
unsecured debt whose value exceeds 
total nonexempt assets. homeowners 
who file for bankruptcy under chapter 
13 are allowed to repay arrears on their 
mortgages over a three- or five-year 
period. Furthermore, bankruptcy 
filing puts an automatic stop to 
lenders’ collection actions, including 
foreclosure on the debtor’s house. The 
stay can be lifted only by the court or 
after the bankruptcy case is dismissed 
or terminated. 
The Determination of Mortgage 
Borrowing and Interest Rates. like 
other goods and services, mortgage 
Bankruptcy and Foreclosure Starts
FIGURE 1
2 A deficiency judgment is a judgment lien 
against a borrower whose foreclosure sale 
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The Foreclosure Process
W
hen a borrower defaults on a home 
mortgage, the lender may attempt to 
recover its losses by repossessing and 
selling the property. This process is 
governed by three types of state property 
laws: the judicial foreclosure process, 
statutory rights of redemption, and deficiency judgments. 
These laws vary widely across states (see the Table on 
pages 22-23 for a summary of the differences).
Under state property laws, two types of foreclosure 
are widely used. The more important type, foreclosure 
by judicial sale, is available in every state and required 
in many. it involves the sale of the mortgaged property 
under the supervision of a court, with the proceeds going 
first to satisfy the mortgage holder, then to satisfy other 
lien holders, and finally to the borrower. The second 
type is foreclosure by power of sale. here, the mortgage 
holder is permitted to sell the property without court 
supervision. Again, proceeds from the sale go first to the 
mortgage holder, then to other lien holders, and finally to 
the borrower.a if the proceeds do not pay off the existing 
mortgage on the property plus costs, most states allow 
the lender to collect a deficiency judgment against the 
borrower’s other assets equal to the lender’s foreclosure 
losses. Deficiency judgments are thus unsecured debt 
that remains after repossession or sale and has the same 
priority as other unsecured debt.
After the foreclosure sale is complete, the 
homeowner can still regain the property if his or her 
state grants a statutory right of redemption. Up to a year 
after the sale, depending on the state, homeowners 
can redeem their property for the foreclosure sale price 
plus foreclosure expenses. The existence of redemption 
rights has resulted in investors’ reluctance to purchase 
a foreclosed property during the redemption period and 
a large percentage of properties become lender-owned 
instead of being sold to a third party immediately after 
the foreclosure.b
Foreclosure is a costly process. A typical foreclosure 
process can last anywhere from a few months to a year, 
depending on the state. The total costs of the foreclosure 
process consist of accrued interest, advances, cost of 
the lawsuit, attorney’s fees, publication fees, and the 
fee of the sheriff or selling officer from the filing of the 
complaint through the foreclosure sale.c everybody loses 
in foreclosure. lenders are estimated to lose almost 30 
percent of their investment in a foreclosure,d and debtors, 
at the least, lose their homes, an outcome that disrupts 
families and communities.
a Where it is available, foreclosure by power of sale is generally faster than foreclosure by judicial sale. From the borrowers’ perspective, the 
requirements of a judicial sale provide several months of free rent and protection against lenders’ imposing excessive fees on borrowers.
b One practical solution is to buy the redemption rights from the owner, either shortly before or shortly after purchasing the property at auction at a 
negotiated price. Typically, redemption rights are sold for amounts ranging from a few hundred to a few thousand dollars. in most cases, an owner 
facing foreclosure who sees no realistic way to either avoid the foreclosure or recover the property afterwards is willing to sell rights he never expects 
to use.
c Researchers have found that the costs amounted to 19.1 percent of the final judgment amount – the amount mortgage borrowers owed to lenders — 
in the case of foreclosure sales in 1993 and 18.43 percent of the final judgment in the case of foreclosure sales in 1994. (See Debra Stark’s article.)
d GMAc-RFc (Residential Funding corporation), America’s largest private issuer of mortgage-backed securities and a leading warehouse lender, 
estimates that it loses over $50,000 per foreclosed home. This number, together with the average loan size of $201,000 at origination in 2004, yields 
a loss rate of over 25 percent. A warehouse loan is a line of credit that a financial institution extends to a loan originator to fund a mortgage used to 
purchase property. (See page 2 of the article by Desiree hatcher, which cites a GMAc-RFc estimate.)
loans and interest rates are determined 
by mortgage supply and demand 
(Figures 2 and 3 on page 24). lines 
labeled l represent the supply of 
mortgages. A particular supply curve 
shows the amount of mortgage loans 
(in dollars) that lenders want to 
provide at each interest rate.  holding 
everything else the same, including 
estimated default risk, the higher 
the interest rate lenders can charge, 
the more willing they are to provide 
mortgage loans. So, the supply curve is 
upward sloping. Anything that affects 
lenders’ ability to make a profit, such 
as the probability that borrowers will 
default on their mortgages and the 
lenders’ losses when they do, will affect 22   Q2  2009 Business Review   www.philadelphiafed.org











Alabama  nJ b 61.5 365 Allowed
Alaska nJ b 105 365 Judicial foreclosure only
Arizona  nJ b 90 105 Varies
Arkansas  e b 70 365 nonjudicial foreclosure only
california  nJ b 117 365 yes, judicial foreclosure only
colorado  nJ b 91 75 yes
connecticut  J J 62 court Decides yes
Delaware  J J 190 0 no
Dist of columbia  nJ nJ 47 0 yes
Florida  J J 135 0 yes
Georgia  nJ b 37 0 yes
hawaii  e b 220 0 yes
idaho  nJ b 150 365 yes
illinois  J J 300 90 Varies
indiana  J J 261 0 yes
iowa  J b 160 20 no
Kansas  J J 130 365 yes
Kentucky  J J 147 365 yes, with restrictions
louisiana  J J 180 0 yes
Maine  J J 240 90 yes
Maryland  J J 46 court Decides yes
Massachusetts  J J 75 0 no
Michigan  nJ nJ 60 197.5 Varies, case by case
Minnesota  nJ b 95 1825 yes
Mississippi  nJ b 90 0 no
Missouri  nJ b 60 365 no
Montana  nJ b 150 0 Judicial foreclosure only
nebraska  J J 142 0 no
nevada  nJ b 116 0 yes
new hampshire  nJ nJ 59 0 yes
new Jersey J J 270 10 yes, restricted
TABLE











new Mexico J J 180 270 yes
new york  J J 445 0 yes
north carolina  nJ b 110 0 Varies case by case
north Dakota J J 150 180-365 yes
Ohio J J 217* 0 yes
Oklahoma  J b 186 0 yes, with time limitation
Oregon  nJ b 150 180 yes, only with judicial foreclosure
Pennsylvania  J J 270 0 yes
Rhode island  nJ b 62 0 yes
South carolina  J J 150 0 yes
South Dakota  J b 150 197.5 Varies case by case
Tennessee  nJ nJ 42.5 730 yes
Texas  nJ b 27 0 yes
Utah  nJ nJ 142 court Decides yes
Vermont  J J 95 272.5 yes
Virginia  nJ b 45 0 yes
Washington  nJ b 135 0 yes, only in judicial foreclosure
West Virginia  nJ nJ 75 0 no
Wisconsin  J b 290 365 yes, unless waived
Wyoming nJ b 60 227.5 yes
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TABLE ... continued
State Foreclosure Laws — Comparison
* before confirmation of foreclosure sale.
note:  J: judicial foreclosure; nJ: nonjudicial foreclosure; b: both judicial and nonjudicial foreclosure are allowed; Actual: what is required by law; 
effective: what is carried out in practice. in general, a nonjudicial foreclosure will proceed in states where a power-of-sale clause can be 
written into the contract. There are a few states (Mi, iA, SD, and OK), however, where a judicial foreclosure is pursued, i.e., effective, even 
though it is not required by law. 
Source:  http://www.foreclosures.com/www/pages/state_laws.asp and http://www.realtytrac.com/foreclosure-laws/foreclosure-laws.asp.
  compiled by Kelly D. edmiston and Dan Reichgott. 
the supply of mortgages. Graphically, 
this is represented as a shift in the 
supply curve, say, from l1 to l2 (if the 
factor makes mortgage lending more 
profitable).
by contrast, mortgage demand, 
as depicted by lines labeled D, moves 
in the opposite direction to interest 
rates. A particular demand curve 
shows the amount of mortgage loans 
(in dollars) that households wish to 
borrow at each interest rate holding 
everything else constant, including the 
default rate. The higher the interest 
rate, the smaller will be households’ 
demand for mortgages. Thus, the 
demand curve is downward sloping. 
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that affects households’ incentives to 
borrow will affect the position of the 
demand curve. Graphically, a factor 
that makes mortgage borrowing more 
or less attractive is represented as a 
shift in the demand curve, say, from D1 
to D2 (if the factor makes taking out a 
mortgage more attractive). 
The final market interest rate and 
mortgage loan amount, or the market 
equilibrium rate and loan amount, 
are determined by the intersection 
of the demand and supply curves. 
economists have identified several 
channels through which the provisions 
of personal bankruptcy laws affect 
mortgage demand and supply. 
Debt Discharge and Bankruptcy 
Exemptions. The first channel comes 
from partial or full discharge of 
unsecured debt and car loans under 
personal bankruptcy. When debtors 
are in financial distress, they can file 
for bankruptcy, obtain discharge of 
their nonmortgage debts, and use 
the funds that would otherwise go to 
nonmortgage lenders to repay their 
mortgages and thereby keep their 
homes, at least for a time. Figure 
2 depicts how debt discharge and 
bankruptcy exemptions affect mortgage 
loan amounts and mortgage interest 
rates.
The more generous the homestead 
and nonhomestead exemptions, the 
more funds borrowers are likely to have 
after filing for bankruptcy. in addi-
tion, higher homestead exemptions 
directly protect debtors’ home equity 
and, consequently, reduce borrowers’ 
incentive to default on mortgage loans. 
These positive effects of bankruptcy 
debt discharge on mortgage payment 
are termed “wealth effects,” since they 
leave borrowers with more wealth or 
funds that can be used to make their 
mortgage payments, which subsequent-
ly increase lenders’ profits for a given 
mortgage demand. The supply curve 
will shift out because of this effect.
Mortgage Demand and Supply
(Mortgage Exemptions)
FIGURE 2
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but exemptions also have a 
counteracting effect on supply. To 
the extent that higher exemptions 
increase households’ incentives to file 
for bankruptcy (and perhaps default 
on their mortgage) or increase lenders’ 
losses in the event of a mortgage 
default, the supply curve will shift 
inward.  The total effect of exemptions 
on the supply of loans depends on the 
relative strength of these two effects: 
The supply curve will shift out from 
l1 to l2 if the first effect dominates, 
and it will shift in from l1 to l3 if the 
second force dominates.
Generous bankruptcy exemptions 
affect mortgage borrowers’ loan 
demand as well. in particular, if 
borrowers are better sheltered by 
bankruptcy laws in the event of 
financial distress, they will be more 
likely to demand larger mortgages. As 
a result, mortgage demand will shift 
out (for example, from D1 to D2 in 
Figure 2).  
To see the net effects of 
exemptions, consider a state that 
increases its exemption level. The new 
equilibrium loan amount and interest 
rate are determined by the new loan 
supply and demand curves. if supply 
shifts out, say, from l1 to l2, the 
equilibrium loan amount will definitely 
be higher (see point b). Whether the 
interest rate will be higher depends on 
whether demand increases more than 
supply. (As drawn, the interest rate is 
higher.) if the loan supply curve shifts 
inward, for example, from l1 to l3, the 
interest rate will certainly be higher, 
but it is unclear whether equilibrium 
loan supply will be higher or lower 
(see point c).  (As drawn, the dollar 
amounts of loan supply are smaller 
than at point b.) 
Automatic Stay. The second 
channel concerns the automatic 
stay provision in bankruptcy law. 
A bankruptcy filing imposes an 
automatic stay on all collection efforts, 
including foreclosure sales. The 
stay can be lifted only by the court. 
in other words, foreclosure cannot 
occur without the court’s approval. 
This generates substantial costs for 
lenders in dealing with borrowers 
who are incapable of maintaining 
their mortgage payments despite their 
bankruptcy filing. The longer these 
households get to stay in the house, 
the more likely it is that the house may 
be damaged, since these households 
no longer have the incentive to do 
regular maintenance, since it’s likely 
they will lose the house. in addition, 
if foreclosure turns out to be the final 
outcome, the lender loses the profits 
from having sold the house earlier. 
both of these effects reduce lenders’ 
profits and thus reduce loan supply. in 
Figure 3, this corresponds to an inward 
shift of the supply curve from l1 to l2.   
by contrast, the automatic stay 
on collection efforts will increase 
borrowers’ demand for mortgages, 
because they will be able to stay in 
their homes for some period in the 
event of financial distress. As the 
new demand curve shifts out, say, 
from D1 to D2, the new equilibrium 
rate and loan amount will be at point 
b. The new interest rate will be 
higher; whether the loan amount will 
be higher depends on whether the 
increase in loan demand more than 
offsets the decline in supply.
What Economists Have Found. 
Taken together, whether bankruptcy 
requirements make the provision of 
equilibrium credit more extensive 
or more difficult depends on the net 
effect of the forces mentioned above. 
in their 1999 paper, Jeremy 
berkowitz and Richard hynes examine 
home Mortgage Disclosure Act 
((hMDA) data3 and find significant 
wealth effects associated with higher 
homestead exemptions. in particular, 
they find that higher homestead 
exemptions have tended to reduce 
mortgage rates and the probability 
of being denied a mortgage. in other 
words, higher exemptions shift the 
supply curve out. Personal exemptions, 
on the other hand, do not have a 
statistically significant impact. 
by contrast, emily lin and 
Michelle White argue that berkowitz 
and hynes’s empirical results are 
biased because they estimate a 
model that takes into account only 
the household’s decision to default 
on its mortgage. instead, lin and 
White argue that an empirical model 
should include both the household’s 
decision to file for bankruptcy, and its 
decision as to whether to default on its 
mortgage. examining the same hMDA 
data as berkowitz and hynes, they 
find a positive relationship between the 
homestead exemption levels and the 
probability of borrowers being denied 
both mortgage and home improvement 
loans after taking into consideration 
borrowers’ incentive to file for 
bankruptcy. The relationship between 
personal property exemptions and the 
probability of being denied either loan, 
however, is insignificant, as found 
by berkowitz and hynes. explaining 
these results, lin and White argue 
that borrowers’ increased incentives 
to default on mortgages because of 
A bankruptcy filing 
imposes an automatic 
stay on all collection 
efforts, including 
foreclosure sales. 
The stay can be lifted 
only by the court. 
3 http://www.ffiec.gov/hmda/26   Q2  2009 Business Review   www.philadelphiafed.org
more generous bankruptcy provisions 
and the provision of an automatic stay 
are much more important than the 
“wealth effects.” Although lenders are 
entitled to collect additional interest to 
compensate for the delay, the available 
assets may not be sufficient to pay 
this interest, nor will these additional 
assets necessarily compensate lenders 
for all the associated costs. 
Several other studies find 
supporting evidence for emily lin 
and Michelle White’s argument. For 
example, using the Panel Study of 
income Dynamics (PSiD), a survey 
that provides detailed financial and 
income information about households,4 
Scott Fay, erik hurst, and Michelle 
White find that higher homestead 
and personal bankruptcy exemptions 
increase the likelihood that borrowers 
will file for bankruptcy. numerous 
studies confirm that bankruptcy 
lengthens the foreclosure process and 
thus incurs substantially more cost to 
lenders.5
Furthermore, in a separate but 
related paper, Reint Gropp, John 
Scholz, and Michelle White show 
that more generous bankruptcy laws 
disproportionately affect low-asset 
households. in particular, using data 
from the Survey of consumer Finances 
(ScF),6 they find that generous state 
bankruptcy exemptions increase the 
amount of credit held by high-asset 
households and reduce the availability 
and amount of credit to low-asset 
households, taking account of other 
observable characteristics that might 
differ across households. They also 
find that interest rates on car loans 
are higher for low-asset households in 
high-exemption states. in other words, 
bankruptcy redistributes credit toward 
high-asset borrowers.7
in summary, although the jury is 
still out, the weight of the evidence 
is that more generous bankruptcy 
laws tend to restrict the availability of 
credit.
EFFECT OF PERSONAL 
BANKRUPTCY LAWS ON 
HOMEOWNERSHIP OUTCOME
Another aspect of the issue 
concerning personal bankruptcy 
laws and residential housing is 
whether personal bankruptcy laws 
help financially distressed borrowers 
save their homes. This question is of 
particular importance in light of the 
current financial crisis.
The same forces that affect 
mortgage demand and supply discussed 
earlier also affect homeowners’ ability 
to keep their homes. Again, the first 
force is the wealth effect. Under either 
chapter 7 or chapter 13, bankruptcy 
exemptions allow borrowers to shift 
their resources toward mortgage 
payments and thereby help them keep 
their homes. The second force comes 
from the automatic stay on lenders’ 
collection activity imposed by the 
bankruptcy court. A bankruptcy filing 
helps debtors save their homes (at 
least temporarily) by stopping lenders 
from closing and by giving debtors 
extra time to repay their overdue 
mortgage payments. This second force 
is particularly strong under chapter 
13, which allows debtors to have 
a repayment plan that spans three 
to five years. bankruptcy trustees 
may also help debtors challenge 
excessive fees and penalties imposed 
by lenders. Katherine Porter, in her 
study, finds that mortgage lenders add 
questionable or excessive fees in half 
of all foreclosures. lower fees in turn 
increase borrowers’ ability to keep their 
homes.8
Finally, Melissa Jacoby argues that 
even in cases where debtors do end up 
losing their houses to foreclosure sale, 
bankruptcy filing gives them time to 
avoid a fire sale, in which the house is 
sold at a large discount. 
Of course, other forces 
counterbalance the aforementioned 
positive effects. A bankruptcy filing 
delays the foreclosure process and 
imposes costs on both borrowers 
and lenders. borrowers have to pay 
bankruptcy filing fees, lawyer fees, 
4 http://psidonline.isr.umich.edu/
5 These studies include articles by Thomas 
Springer and neil Waller; brent Ambrose, 
Richard buttimer, and charles capone; and 
Dennis capozza and Thomas Thomson.
6 http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/oss/oss2/
scfindex.html
A bankruptcy filing helps debtors save their 
homes (at least temporarily) by stopping
lenders from closing and by giving debtors
extra time to repay their overdue 
mortgage payments.
7 in their paper, Souphala chomsisengphet and 
Ronel elul argue that bankruptcy exemptions 
affect lenders’ credit supply and mortgage 
loan terms only to the extent that they affect 
borrowers’ payment behavior and, thus, their 
credit bureau score.
8 These arguments are nicely laid out in 
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trustee fees, and so forth. in a chapter 
13 filing, trustee fees alone amount to 
between 6 to 10 percent of the total 
payments borrowers have to make 
through the repayment plan. The 
cost to lenders is even higher, and it 
includes lost mortgage interest, the 
time cost of money, and depreciated 
property value. 
Do Homeowners Keep Their 
Homes? The empirical evidence 
on whether bankruptcy filing helps 
homeowners retain their homes is 
mixed. 
First, the treatment of 
homeownership is an important 
matter for many bankrupt households. 
economists have found that the 
majority of chapter 13 filers are 
homeowners who (presumably) wish to 
save their homes. For example, hülya 
eraslan, Pierre-Daniel Sarte, and i 
studied chapter 13 bankruptcy filings 
in Delaware between 2001 and 2002 
and found that over 80 percent of the 
filers owned homes at the time of filing 
and that their mortgage loan-to-value 
ratio exceeded 90 percent. in another 
study, Michelle White and ning Zhu 
also found that the vast majority (96 
percent) of their bankrupt Delaware 
households were homeowners. This 
is despite the fact that a major 
bankruptcy reform adopted in 2005 
was intended to force some bankruptcy 
filers to repay their unsecured debts 
in chapter 13. even in chapter 7, the 
homeownership rate approached 50 
percent, according to ning Zhu’s 2007 
article.9 
On the other hand, it is not clear 
whether the bankruptcy filing helped 
borrowers remain homeowners in 
the long run. First and foremost, the 
failure rate of chapter 13 repayment 
plans is surprisingly high. in separate 
studies, Scott norberg and Andrew 
Velkey and hülya eraslan, Pierre-
Daniel Sarte, and i document that 
the final discharge rates of chapter 13 
cases are as low as 33 percent. That 
is, only about 33 percent of chapter 
13 filers successfully completed their 
repayment plans. borrowers who fail to 
complete their repayment plan will not 
have their unsecured debt discharged, 
and lenders will immediately resume 
their collection efforts as soon as 
borrowers exit bankruptcy. These low 
discharge rates are also corroborated 
by anecdotal evidence in the legal 
literature.
Second, despite their bankruptcy 
filing, a significant number of 
homeowners still end up losing their 
houses to foreclosure sales within 
five to six years of their bankruptcy 
filing. Sarah carroll and i studied 
homeowners who filed for bankruptcy 
between 2001 and 2002 in new 
castle county, Delaware, until 
2007 and found that close to 30 
percent of these filers still lost their 
houses to foreclosure sales. The rate 
increases substantially, to 40 percent, 
if we consider homeowners who 
were already one year late on their 
mortgage payments at the time of 
filing, compared to 43 percent of those 
homeowners who went to foreclosure 
without filing for bankruptcy. This 
finding is consistent with Raisa 
bahchieva, Susan Wachter, and 
elizabeth Warren’s survey result that 
many homeowners in financial distress 
are simply hanging on to their houses 
without any realistic hope of repaying 
their mortgages.
The Costs of Borrowers Staying 
in their Homes.  Researchers find 
that filing for bankruptcy prolongs 
borrowers’ stay in their home before 
they eventually lose it to foreclosure 
sales. For example, Thomas Springer 
and neil Waller find that bankruptcy 
filing lengthens the foreclosure process 
by half a year to one year. Sarah 
carroll and i find that a chapter 13 
bankruptcy filing adds, on average, 
one year to the borrower’s foreclosure 
process. A study by brent Ambrose, 
Richard buttimer, and charles 
capone, and another by Dennis 
capozza and Thomas Thomson 
also find supporting evidence that 
bankruptcy filing delays foreclosure 
sales but has little effect in helping 
mortgage loans to become current. 
but this result is a double-edged 
sword. While borrowers may have 
enjoyed additional benefits from 
staying in their own homes, the cost 
to lenders is high. in addition to the 
added cost mentioned earlier in the 
event that the bankruptcy plan fails 
and the foreclosure process begins 
again, lenders collect very little in 
cases under chapter 13. For example, 
norberg and Velkey find that the 
average repayment rate for secured 
lenders under chapter 13 is 31 percent, 
and hülya eraslan, Pierre-Daniel 
Sarte, and i find the rate to be a mere 
22 percent.10 
Finally, there is also evidence that 
final sale price is negatively correlated 
with the length of a borrower’s stay in 
bankruptcy and foreclosure together. 
For instance, Sarah carroll and i find 
9 in their 2005 article, Raisa bahchieva, Susan 
Wachter, and elizabeth Warren document 
similar findings for an earlier period.
10 See my 2007 Business Review article for more 
details.
Researchers 
find that filing for 
bankruptcy prolongs 
borrowers’ stay in 
their home before 
they eventually lose it 
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that longer time-to-sale is associated 
with lower sale price; the correlation 
coefficient of the gap between 
bankruptcy filing and foreclosure sale 
and the final foreclosure sale price 
adjusted for inflation and house price 
growth is -0.16.
Although the existing literature 
finds that bankruptcy filing offers 
extra breathing room to homeowners 
who try to keep their homes, the 
eventual success rate is low and the 
added cost to lenders is high. 
A Caveat. before concluding, 
it is worth noting that many of the 
empirical studies cited in this section 
are based on a sample of bankruptcy 
filers, instead of a random sample 
of households in the U.S. consisting 
of both bankruptcy filers and 
nonbankruptcy filers. This can lead to 
what economists call a selection bias. 
The outcomes for the bankruptcy filers 
may not be the result of the features 
of the bankruptcy process but may be 
the result of some factor common to 
households that file for bankruptcy.
For example, the fact that a large 
number of homeowners lose their 
houses despite filing for bankruptcy 
may be simply because only households 
in desperate financial straits file for 
bankruptcy. in a properly designed test 
we would be comparing outcomes for 
essentially identical households: some 
who file for bankruptcy and some who 
don’t. Therefore, while the stylized 
facts remain true, it is hard to conclude 
definitely whether bankruptcy 
helps homeowners preserve their 
homeownership. Since any changes 
in bankruptcy law would not only 
alter the bankruptcy outcome but also 
affect households’ decision to file for 
bankruptcy, a fully convincing analysis 
should take account of both effects.
WHAT’S NEXT?
The existing literature on 
bankruptcy and homeownership has 
focused on two questions. First, how 
do personal bankruptcy provisions 
affect credit supply? Second, how do 
the personal bankruptcy provisions 
affect households’ homeownership 
outcome? While the literature 
generally supports the conclusion that 
more generous bankruptcy provisions 
lead to more restrictive credit supply, 
answers to the second question are 
much more mixed. economists agree 
that homeowners take advantage of 
personal bankruptcy to try to retain 
their homes, particularly under 
chapter 13. nonetheless, only a small 
proportion of households succeed in 
keeping their homes in the long run. 
Furthermore, while bankruptcy filing 
adds to the length of the foreclosure 
process, the cost to lenders is high.
Proponents of recent legislation 
are likely to argue again that existing 
mechanisms to avoid foreclosure in 
bankruptcy need to be strengthened. 
To better evaluate such proposals, 
research needs to advance on two 
fronts.
First, we need to build a 
consistent framework that takes into 
consideration the effect of bankruptcy 
provisions and filings on credit supply 
and demand as well as mortgage 
payments and homeownership 
retention. Michelle White and ning 
Zhu have taken the first step and 
provided a highly simplified framework 
in which households live only two 
periods. in the first period, households 
decide how much unsecured debt, 
mortgages, and automobile loans to 
borrow. in the second period, upon 
learning their income and asset value, 
they must decide whether to repay 
their loans, default on their mortgages, 
and/or enter bankruptcy. While 
instructive, this framework doesn’t 
allow researchers to explore certain 
types of long-term decisions. For 
example, chapter 7 bankruptcy filers 
cannot file for bankruptcy for the next 
six years, a factor that households will 
take into account when they decide 
whether to enter bankruptcy. The next 
step will be to extend this framework 
to a dynamic setting in which 
households will enjoy or suffer the 
effects of their decisions beyond the 
current period in which the decision is 
made and its immediate future. 
Second, we need to collect 
additional national data, particularly 
in panel form, that will allow 
researchers to follow households 
over time. Such data will help us 
overcome the selection bias that the 
existing literature suffers from. Any 
analysis that examines only those 
that have entered bankruptcy may 
lead to relationships that appear 
much stronger than they actually 
are or, in some cases, relationships 
that are completely illusory artifacts. 
A national database will also help 
us overcome regional bias, since 
bankruptcy exemptions and foreclosure 
laws differ substantially from state to 
state. B R 
Any analysis that examines only those 
that have entered bankruptcy may lead to 
relationships that appear much stronger than 
they actually are or, in some cases, relationships 
that are completely illusory artifacts.REFERENCES
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